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Summary  
 
General equilibrium is a central concept of economic theory. Unlike partial equilibrium 
analysis which study the equilibrium of a particular market under the clause “ceteris paribus” 
that revenues and prices on the other markets stay approximately unaffected, the ambition of a 
general equilibrium model is to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium in all markets of a 
competitive economy. Definition of the abstract model, some of its basic results and insights 
are presented. The important issues of uniqueness and local uniqueness of equilibrium are 
sketched; they are the condition for a predictive power of the theory and its ability to allow 
for statics comparisons. Finally, we review the main extensions of the general equilibrium 
model. Besides the natural extensions to infinitely many commodities and to a continuum of  
agents, some examples show how economic theory can accommodate the main ideas in order 
to  study some contexts which were not thought of by the initial model. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the Walrasian model of general equilibrium 
is formulated in the concept of equilibrium of a so-called private ownership economy. In such 
an economy, finitely many price-taking consumers (who are endowed with initial holdings of 
the different commodities and who collect given shares of the profits from production) 
consume the commodities available on the market, optimizing their preferences among all 
possible consumption plans that satisfy their budget constraint. Finitely many producers, who 
also take prices as given, maximize their profit on their individual set of possible production 
plans; they produce the commodities which satisfy consumers’ demand in competition with 
the initial resources not used by production. Market clearing determines equilibrium prices 
and the quantities actually consumed and produced at a state of equilibrium. Market clearing 
may result in the strict equality of supply and demand; we will then speak of (strict) 
equilibrium.  But, conceivably, the conditions for equilibrium may require that excess demand 
be non-positive and that, for any commodity for which it is negative, the price be zero; we 
will then speak of free-disposal equilibrium.  
Existence of equilibrium prices is the necessary test of consistency for a model which bases 
the coordination of plans of diverse economic agents on the fact that prices faced by all agents 
provide the common flow of information needed to coordinate the system. And, indeed, 
equilibrium exists under reasonable assumptions. Just as important is the relation between the 
existence of solutions and the problems of normative economics. The Paretian study of 
optimality considers the problem of efficient organization of an economy with an unspecified 
distribution of resources and shows that for any Pareto optimal feasible allocation there exists 
a price system to which consumers and producers are adapted. The Debreu-Scarf theorem 
shows that the same is true at the limit for an allocation that no coalition can block, in an 
economy with a specified distribution of resources when the number of consumers tends to 
infinity. These results have been first obtained in the 1950s and 1960s simultaneously by the 
three founders of the general equilibrium theory: K.J. Arrow, G. Debreu and, in a slightly 
different setting, L.W. McKenzie. Extended since then, these achievements strongly rely on 
convexity assumptions on the characteristics of the agents and on the use of convex analysis 
and fixed point theory. They confirm the new dependence of Mathematical Economics on an 
increasing list of mathematical tools such as functional analysis, measure theory, differential 
topology, non-smooth analysis, ordered sets theory … .  
After 1970, the general equilibrium theory developed in several directions. First, in what we 
will call the classical model (finite number of commodities, finite number of agents), the 
conditions for equilibrium existence and optimality results have been strongly weakened. 
Besides, the model itself has been generalized in order to allow for an infinity of time periods 
and states of the world in the specification of commodities, and for an infinity of agents. The 
abstract model has also been modified in order to accommodate the analysis of a great variety 
of economic settings where properties of equilibrium may fail to hold. The different contexts 
share a same methodology with the classical model of general equilibrium: the assumption 
that individuals, who have perfect (imperfect in case of differential information) foresight for 
each future state of the world, make their transactions in one initial market for the whole 
future and all states of the world. This common methodology explains the central role of 
general equilibrium in economic theory and maybe some of their common drawbacks. 
In what follows, Sections 2, 3, and 4 present the current state-of-the-art for the classical 
model. Section 5 sketch the issues of uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. Section 6 
discusses some extensions. 
 
2. The classical model 
 
Commodities 
In the classical model, only a finite number of commodities are exchanged, produced or 
consumed. The commodity space is thus  R l , the real vector space of dimension   l . The vector 
  z = zk( )k=1l ∈ R l  denotes a commodity bundle with sign conventions explained below.  
 
Private ownership economies and their agents 
On this commodity space, a private ownership economy is completely specified by: 
E = X i,P i,ω i( )i∈I , Y j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
where 
• I  is a finite set of consumers. Typically, a consumer is an individual but may be a 
household or a larger group with a common purpose. A consumer may even be a 
country in a model of international trade. For each consumer i ∈ I , a consumption set 
  X i ⊂ R l  is the set of all consumption plans physically (or socially) possible for him. 
The consumption plan x i ∈ X i  is a list  xk
i( )
k=1
l
 of the quantities of the various 
commodities that the consumer i  consumes (positive numbers) or delivers (negative 
numbers). The preference correspondence P i : X h
h ∈I
∏ → X i describes the tastes of 
consumer i . Under the condition that x i ∉ Pi x( ), the set P i x( ) is interpreted as the 
set of consumption vectors ′ x i strictly preferred to x i  when the consumption vectors 
of all consumers h ≠ i are xh . Such a dependence may be justified by imitation or 
other psychological effects. It encompasses the case when  consumer’s preferences 
depend only on his own consumption vector and, a fortiori, the case when consumer i  
has a complete preference preorder ≥i on his consumption set and 
  P
i x i( )= ′ x i ∈ X i ′ x i f i x i{ }. The vector ω i is the i th consumer’s initial endowment in 
each one of the commodities. 
• J  is a finite set of producers. For each producer j ∈ J , the production set Y j  is the 
set of all production plans technically possible for the j th producer. A production plan 
y j ∈ Y j  is a list   yk
j( )
k=1
l
 of the quantities of the various commodities that the producer 
j  consumes as inputs (negative numbers) or produces as outputs (positive numbers). 
• For all i ∈ I  and j ∈ J , the profit-share θij  is the contractual claim of consumer i  on 
the profit of producer j . By definition, the θij  are nonnegative and for every j , 
θij =1
i∈I
∑ . 
A particular case of private ownership economy is the exchange economy, where there is 
no production, specified by: 
E = X i,Pi,ω i( )
i∈I  
Feasibility and market clearing 
An allocation  
x, y( )∈ X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  
is feasible (or attainable) if  
x i − ω i
i∈I
∑
i∈I
∑ − y j
j ∈J
∑ = 0 
 feasible (or attainable) with free-disposal if 
x i
i∈I
∑ − ω i
i∈I
∑ − y j
j ∈J
∑ ≤ 0 
Equilibrium 
Let   S = {p ∈ R l : p =1} be the sphere with center 0 y radius 1. If each p ∈ S  represents a 
possible list of the (normalized) prices of each commodity, an equilibrium of E  is a point  
 
p, x, y( )∈ S × X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  
satisfying the following conditions: 
1. For each i ∈ I , p.x i ≤ p.ω i + θij p.
j ∈J
∑ y j  and x i ∈ Pi x( )⇒ p.x i > p.x i  
2. For each j ∈ J , for all y j ∈ Y j , p.y j ≤ p.y j  
3. The allocation x, y( ) is feasible. 
The point p, x, y( )∈ S × X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏ is a free-disposal equilibrium if, in the previous 
definition, the third condition is replaced by:  
3’. The allocation x, y( ) is attainable with free-disposal and  p. y j + ω i − x
i∈I
∑
i∈I
∑ i
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
  = 0. 
Condition 1 states that at equilibrium every consumer has chosen in his consumption set a 
consumption plan which best satisfies his preferences under his budget constraint. Summing 
over i the budget constraints, it follows then from Condition 3) or 3’) that, at equilibrium, 
every consumer spends his equilibrium revenue: ∀i ∈ I , . p.x i = p.ω i + θij p.y j
j ∈J
∑ .  
Condition 2 states that every producer chooses a production plan so as to maximize his profit 
in his production set.  
 
Condition 3 states at equilibrium the equality between the total supply and the total demand. 
In case of free-disposal equilibrium, Condition 3’ ensures that the cost of the disposal needed 
for achieving equilibrium is minimized and equal to zero.  
 
A clever reader will have observed that the free-disposal equilibrium of an economy is thus 
the equilibrium of a fictitious economy identical to the original one but where an additional 
price-taker and profit-maximizing producer has the negative orthant  −R l as his production set. 
It is easily deduced from this remark that, at a free-disposal equilibrium, the equilibrium 
vector price is non-negative. This need not be the case if the equilibrium is strict, that is, 
without free-disposal. Some commodities may be noxious or at least non-desired at 
equilibrium; the disposal needed for achieving equilibrium is not free anymore and may 
involve costly activities.  
 
Quasi-equilibrium 
A point p, x, y( )∈ S × X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  is a quasi-equilibrium (resp. free-disposal quasi 
equilibrium) if it satisfies the profit-maximization and feasibility conditions of the 
corresponding equilibrium definition and if Condition 1) is replaced by the weaker condition:  
1’. For each i ∈ I , p.x i ≤ p.ω i + θij p.
j ∈J
∑ y j  and x i ∈ Pi x( )⇒ p.x i ≥ p.x i . 
The interpretation of Condition 1’ is not very appealing since it means that, at a quasi-
equilibrium, no consumer could be strictly better spending strictly less than his budget 
constraint. The interest of the quasi-equilibrium concept is purely mathematical. As we will 
see in the next section, the equilibrium existence proofs actually establish the existence of a 
quasi-equilibrium, allowing for a clear distinction between the quasi-equilibrium existence 
problem and the investigation of the conditions which guarantee that a quasi-equilibrium is an 
equilibrium. 
 
3. Existence of equilibrium 
 
Several equilibrium existence proofs are available in the literature. Among the three main 
approaches, the excess demand approach obtains the equilibrium price as a zero of the excess 
demand correspondence (a zero of the excess quasi-demand correspondence for the quasi-
equilibrium price). This approach requires the preferences of each consumer to be formalized 
by a complete preorder on their consumption set.  
The so-called Negishi approach bases the equilibrium existence on a fixed-point theorem 
applied in the utility space, that is in the vector space RI  whose dimension is equal to the 
finite number of consumers. This approaches requires the preferences of each consumer to be 
represented by a utility function but, since the first writings of Debreu, economists know that, 
at least when the commodity space is finite dimensional and under the usual assumptions of 
the equilibrium existence theorem, there is no loss of generality to assume that complete 
preference preorders on the consumption sets are represented by utility functions.  
The approach presented below is the simultaneous optimization approach. The interest of this 
approach and of the theorems which will be presented is to be not too much demanding in 
terms of the rationality of consumers’ choices (consumers’ preferences need not be complete 
or even transitive) and to allow for some dependence of the individual preferences on the 
actions of the other agents. 
 
3.1. Equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium of abstract economies 
 
An abstract economy (generalized qualitative game, social system) is completely specified by 
Γ = X i,α i,Pi( )
i∈N  
where N  is a finite set of  agents (players) and for each i ∈ N , 
• X i is a choice set (or strategy set) that we will assume to be a subset of some finite 
dimensional vector space, 
• The correspondence α i : X h
h ∈N
∏ → X i is called constraint correspondence. For 
x ∈ X := X h
h ∈N
∏ ,  the set α i x( ) is interpreted as the set of the possible strategies for i  
given the choices x h( )
h≠ i  of the other agents, 
• The correspondence  Pi : X h
h ∈N
∏ → X i is a preference correspondence. For each 
x ∈ X , under the condition that x i ∉ Pi x( ), the set P i x( ) is interpreted as the set of 
elements of X i strictly preferred by i  when the choice of the other agents is x h( )
h≠ i . 
An equilibrium of  Γ  is a point x ∈ X  such that for each i ∈ N , 
1. x
i ∈ α i x( ) 
2. P i x( )∩α i x( )= ∅. 
The interpretation is that at each component of the equilibrium point, the corresponding agent 
best satisfies his preferences in his constraint correspondence. 
 
As a special case, if for every i ∈ Nand for every x ∈ X , α i x( )= X i, in other words if 
Γ = X i,Pi( )
i∈N  is a qualitative game, an equilibrium of  Γ  is nothing other than a Nash 
equilibrium of the qualitative game Γ . 
 
Now, let β i : X → X i be correspondences satisfying for every i ∈ N  and for every x ∈ X , 
3. β i x( )⊂ α i x( ) 
4. β i x( )≠ ∅⇒ β i x( )= α i x( ) 
where for a set A , A  denotes the closure of A . 
Given β = β i( )
i∈N , a β -quasi-equilibrium is a point x ∈ X  such that for each i ∈ N , 
       5. x
i ∈ α i x( ) 
       6. P i x( )∩ β i x( )= ∅ . 
  
β -quasi-equilibrium existence 
The existence of a β -quasi-equilibrium can be deduced from the Gale–Mas-Colell lemma, 
lemma itself proved using Kakutani’s theorem and a powerful selection theorem due to 
Michael. 
 
Lemma (Gale–Mas-Colell) Let N  be a finite set of indices. Given X = X i
i∈N
∏ , where for 
each i ∈ N , X i is a nonempty compact convex subset of some finite dimensional Euclidean 
vector space, let for each i , ϕ i : X → X i be a lower semi-continuous correspondence with 
convex (possibly empty) values. Then there exists x ∈ X  such that for each i ∈ N , either 
ϕ i x( )= ∅ or x i ∈ ϕ i x( ). 
  
The existence of a β - quasi-equilibrium for an abstract economy is proved under the 
following assumptions for each i ∈ N : 
(a) X i is a nonempty compact convex subset of some finite dimensional Euclidean vector 
space, 
(b) α i  is an upper semi-continuous and non empty closed convex-valued correspondence, 
(c) β i is convex-valued, 
(d) the correspondence x → β i x( )∩ Pi x( ) is lower semi-continuous, 
(e) the correspondence Pi is convex-valued and for all x ∈ X , x i ∉ Pi x( ). 
  
Proposition 1 Under the conditions (a) – (e) and for β  defined as above, the abstract 
economy Γ = X i,α i,Pi( )
i∈N  has a β  quasi-equilibrium. It is an equilibrium provided that for 
every i , β i x( )≠ ∅. 
  
3.2. Application to quasi-equilibrium existence for private ownership economies 
 
  Let  
E = X i,P i,ω i( )
i∈I , Y
j( )
j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
be a private ownership economy as defined in Section 2. In the following, A E( ) will denote, 
according to the case under consideration, the set of feasible (resp.  feasible with free-
disposal) allocations of the economy. For each i ∈ I , j ∈ J , ˆ X i, ˆ Y j  will denote the 
projections of this set on the corresponding consumption or production set, that is the feasible 
sets of each consumer and producer.  
 
Quasi-equilibrium existence for the economy is proved under the following assumptions: 
1. For each i ∈ I , 
(a) X i is convex and closed, ˆ X i is compact 
(b) Pi is lower semi-continuous with convex values and for all x ∈ X , x i ∉ Pi x( ), 
(c) ω i ∈ X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑  (
  
ω i ∈ X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑ − R+l  in case of free-disposal), 
(d) for each feasible allocation x,y( ), x i ∈ Pi x( ); 
2. For each j ∈ J , 0 ∈ Y j  which is convex and closed, ˆ Y j  is compact;  
3. The total production set Y := Y j
j ∈J
∑  is closed (  Y + R+l  in case of free-disposal). 
Besides convexity, closedness and continuity assumptions, Assumption 1 (c) is a weak 
survival assumption: for each consumer, a consumption vector is possible using his own 
resources and, eventually, his share of the productive system. Assumption 1 (d) means that for 
each consumer, a feasible consumption vector  is a point of local no-satiation: each consumer 
can be strictly better with a consumption vector as close as desired from his actual 
consumption in the feasible allocation. The compactness of all feasible sets, in 1 (a) and 2, 
can be obtained under, for example, the assumption that all consumption sets are bounded 
below ant that all production sets are bounded above. More sophisticated assumptions on the 
total consumption set X i
i∈I
∑  and the total production set Y j
j ∈J
∑ can be found in the literature; 
eventually stated in terms of the recession cones of these sets, they guarantee the same result. 
 
Sketch of the proof for a compact economy  
In order to apply Proposition 1, the quasi-equilibrium existence for the private ownership 
economy  is first proved assuming that, besides the previous assumptions, consumption and 
production sets are bounded. Agents of the abstract economy associated to the private owner 
ship economy are: 
 
• the consumers, with their consumption set as strategy set, the same preferences as in 
the private ownership economy, the budget correspondence 
 
α i p( )= x i ∈ X i p.x i ≤ p.ω i + θij
j
∑ p.y j + 1− p
I
 
  
  



 
as constraint correspondence, and 
β i p( )= x i ∈ X i p.x i < p.ω i + θij
j
∑ p.y j + 1− p
I
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
• the producers with their production set as strategy set, correspondences α j  and β j  
whose values in reaction to the actions of the other agents are identically equal to 
their production set, preferences on their strategy set associated in a obvious way with 
the objective of profit maximization 
 
• an additional agent, interpreted as the Walras auctioneer, who sets prices in reaction 
to demands and supplies of consumers and producers with the objective of 
maximizing the value of the excess demand. His strategy set is the compact convex 
set of prices   X
0 = B = p ∈ R l p ≤1{ }, the closed unit-ball centered at the origin and 
with radius equal to 1 (or the intersection of this ball with the positive orthant   R+l  in 
case of free-disposal). In reaction to the actions of consumers and producers, 
correspondences α 0 and βO  have values identically equal to X 0 . 
 
In α i p( ) and β i p( ), the addition to the regular revenue of consumers of a non-negative 
extra term depending on the norm of the price is a stratagem due to Bergstrom and has as 
objective to allow the different correspondences to satisfy the continuity properties 
assumed in Proposition 1. Applying this proposition, one gets a point p, x, y( ) satisfying 
the conditions for quasi-equilibrium of the economy, provided that p =1. The 
verification of this last condition completes the proof of the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 Under the conditions 1. (a) – (d), 2. and 3. a private ownership economy 
E = X i,P i,ω i( )
i∈I , Y
j( )
j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) whose consumption and production sets are 
bounded admits a quasi-equilibrium. 
 
Quasi-equilibrium existence in the original economy 
Taking advantage of the compactness of the feasible sets of consumers and producers, 
assumed in 1 (a) and 2, the idea of the proof is then to replace the original economy E  by 
a compact one satisfying the same assumptions.  
Let   K ⊂ R l  be a compact convex set containing all feasible sets in its interior. One 
associates with the original economy a compact economy with the sets   ) X i = X i ∩ K  and 
  ) Y j = Y j ∩ K  as consumption and production sets.  
In order to facilitate passing from a quasi-equilibrium of the compact economy to a 
quasi-equilibrium of the original economy, the original consumer’s preference 
correspondences are also replaced by the Gale–Mas-Colell augmented preference 
correspondences: 
ˆ P i x( )= zi ∈ X i zi = λx i + 1− λ( )z'i ,0 ≤ λ <1,z'i ∈ Pi x( ){ } 
Note that the augmented preference correspondences are semi-continuous if the original 
preference correspondences are assumed to be semi-continuous, and that x i ∈ ˆ P i x( ) if 
P i x( )≠ ∅. The possible replacement of local no-satiation assumptions by no-satiation 
assumptions (at any component of a feasible allocation) is also a reason for introducing 
the Gale–Mas-Colell augmented preferences  
 
Consider the compact economy  
  
) 
E = ) X i, ˆ P i,ω i( )
i∈I ,
) 
Y j( )
j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J     
where the augmented preferences in the original economy and their obvious restrictions 
in the compact economy are noted identically. Applying the quasi-equilibrium existence 
result for compact economies, it is then shown that the economy  
′ E = X i, ˆ P i,ω i( )
i∈I , Y
j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
has a quasi-equilibrium p, x, y( )∈ S × X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏ . This quasi-equilibrium is a fortiori 
a quasi-equilibrium of the original economy E . Moreover, it follows from the remark 
above that the quasi-equilibrium existence has been obtained with Assumption 1 (d) 
replaced by the weaker assumption: 
 
1. (d’) For each i ∈ I  and for every feasible allocation x,y( ), P i x( )≠ ∅.   
 
To summarize, 
 
Proposition 3 Under the conditions 1 (a) –(c), (d’), 2 and 3, a private ownership 
economy E = X i,P i,ω i( )i∈I , Y j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) admits a quasi-equilibrium. 
 
Before closing this sub-section, let us remark that a glance to the proofs presented here 
shows that, under convenient assumptions, the quasi-equilibrium existence result could 
accommodate consumers’ preferences depending on the current production vector and 
also price-dependent preferences which may make sense in economic models. 
 
3.3. From quasi-equilibrium to quasi-equilibrium 
 
More continuity of preferences 
Now, let us set an additional continuity condition on consumers’ preferences: 
 
1. (e) For each i ∈ I  and for every x ∈ X , the set P i x( ) is open in X i. 
 
Then, if for all p ∈ S , we set 
γ i p( )= x i ∈ X i p.x i ≤ p.ω i + θij max p.Y j∑     



 
the budget set of the i th consumer and  
δ i p( )= x i ∈ X i p.x i < p.ω i + θij max p.Y j∑     



 
we can remark that δ i p( )≠ ∅, x i ∈ γ i p( ) and P i x( )∩δ i p( )= ∅  imply P i x( )∩ γ i p( )= ∅ . 
 
Thus, the investigation of conditions under which a quasi-equilibrium of E  is also an 
equilibrium is reduced to the search for conditions under which δ i p( )≠ ∅ for all i ∈ I , if p  is 
a quasi-equilibrium price. 
 
Strong survival versus non-triviality of the quasi-equilibrium and irreducibility of the 
economy 
The strong survival assumption:  
1. (f) For each i ∈ I , ω i ∈ int X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑    


 where int A  denotes the interior of A  
(
  
ω i ∈ int X i − θijY j + R+l
j ∈J
∑    


 in case of free-disposal) 
is such an assumption. It ensures that, at the quasi-equilibrium price, each consumer can 
consume without spending his entire revenue, that is δ i p( )≠ ∅ for all i ∈ I . 
To see this in the case of no-disposal, recall that p ≠ 0. For each i ∈ I , pick   u ∈ R l  such that 
p.u < 0  and ω i + u ∈ X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑ . One can write x i = u + ω i + θij y j
j ∈J
∑  for some x i ∈ X i , 
y = y j( )∈ Y j
j ∈J
∏ , which implies p.x i < p.ω i + θij p
j ∈J
∑ .y j ≤ p.ω i + p.y∑ j . The proof is 
similar in case of free-disposal. 
 
It is possible to weaken the strong survival assumption, replacing it by the following: 
 
 ω := ω i
i∈I
∑ ∈ int X i
i∈I
∑ − Y j
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
   
(
  
ω := ω i
i∈I
∑ ∈ int X i
i∈I
∑ − Y j + R+l
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
   in case of free-disposal). 
This is still a strong interiority assumption which insures that, at the quasi-equilibrium price, 
at least one consumer can consume  without spending his entire revenue. The quasi-
equilibrium is then said to be non-trivial.  
It should be noticed that for the non-triviality of quasi-equilibrium, as shown by counter-
examples, the interiority assumption cannot be dispensed with, without additional 
assumptions on the characteristics of the economy, for example assumptions analogous to the 
properness assumptions used in infinite dimensional economies. 
 
The role of an irreducibility assumption is to guarantee that the non-emptiness of one δ i p( ) 
implies the non-emptiness of all. The general idea is to assume that, in some sense to be 
specified, it is always possible for any non-empty and proper group of consumers to benefit 
from the resources of the group of the other consumers. Various irreducibility assumptions 
have been proposed by Gale in the context of linear exchange economies, McKenzie, Debreu, 
Arrow-Hahn, Bergstrom and many others. To enter in the technical subtleties of the different 
formulations would exceed the objectives of this survey. 
 
Collecting the findings of this section, the equilibrium existence theorem can now be stated. 
 
Theorem 1 Let E = X i,P i,ω i( )i∈I , Y j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) be a private ownership economy 
satisfying the assumptions satisfying the assumptions 1. (a), (b), (c), (d’) (e), 2 and 3, and let 
p, x, y( )∈ S × X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏ be a quasi-equilibrium of this economy. If in addition,  
• either E  satisfies 1. (f), that is the strong survival assumption for every consumer, 
• or the quasi-equilibrium is non-trivial and E  is irreducible, 
 
then p, x, y( ) is an equilibrium. 
 
4. Optimality properties of equilibrium 
 
The optimality notion which allows to establish that an equilibrium allocation is optimal goes 
back to Pareto. Roughly speaking, in the general equilibrium model, a feasible allocation is 
Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible allocation that each individual (actually each 
consumer) would prefer. In the same guise, the term of Pareto optimality is used nowadays in 
several problems of multi-criteria or multi-objective optimization in which a planner refuses 
to compare states that improve some criteria (e.g. the utility of some agents) decreasing some 
other ones (e.g. the utility of some other agents).  
The cooperative game theoretic notion of core of a private ownership economy corresponds 
to the idea that no feasible allocation is sustainable as an equilibrium allocation if consumers 
are free to cooperate, in a way to be defined, and a coalition of consumers can obtain an 
allocation feasible for themselves and that they all prefer to the given allocation. As we will 
see, a core allocation is defined as an allocation blocked by no coalition. 
Finally, the desirable persistency of this kind of stability against re-contracting in a private 
ownership economy when the relative weights of each consumer become infinitesimal leads 
to the definition of limit-core concepts. 
After a precise definition of these notions which will be given below, basic results of welfare 
economics as the optimality of equilibrium allocations, belonging of these allocations to the 
core of the economy, and even to the core of all replica economies will become simple 
tautologies. More interesting are the converse issues. Statement of converse results and their 
proof constitute the main objective of this section. Before stating these theorems, we will 
verify with non-emptiness results the consistency of the newly introduced notions. 
 
4.1 Optimality, core and limit-core concepts 
 
Pareto dominance and Pareto optimality 
Let  
E = X i,P i( )
i∈I , Y
j( )
j ∈J ,ω( ) 
be an economy for which we specify neither the repartition of the whole initial endowment ω  
among the consumers nor the profit shares corresponding to the ownership of the different 
firms by the different consumers. If x,y( ) and ′ x , ′ y ( ) are two feasible allocations of E , we 
shall say that the feasible consumption allocation ′x  is (strictly) preferred to (or strictly 
dominates) the feasible consumption allocation x  if for all i ∈ I , ′ x i ∈ Pi x( ). Then, a feasible 
consumption allocation x  is Pareto optimal if it is (strictly) dominated by no other feasible 
consumption allocation. In the case when each consumer i  has a complete preorder of 
preferences ≥i on his consumption set X i (recall that then  P
i x( )= ′ x i ∈ X i ′ x i f i x i{ }), one 
uses also a weaker dominance relation: the feasible consumption allocation ′x  weakly 
dominates the feasible consumption allocation x  if ′ x i ≥i x i  for all consumers i ∈ I  and if the 
preference is strict for at least one of them. Then a feasible consumption allocation x  is said 
to be a strong Pareto optimum if it is weakly dominated by no other feasible allocation. 
In the following, the set 
ˆ X = x ∈ X i ∃y ∈ Y j , x i = ω + y j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑
j ∈J
∏
i∈I
∏     



 
will denote the set of all feasible consumption allocations of the economy. 
 
Core of an economy 
 
Consider now a private ownership economy 
E = X i,P i,ω i( )
i∈I , Y
j( )
j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
as defined in Section 2 and studied in Section 3. A coalition is any nonempty subset S  of the 
set I  of consumers. If X S = X i
i∈S
∏ , a vector xS = x iS( )
i∈S ∈ X S  is a consumption assignment 
for the coalition S . A preference relation PS : X i
i∈I
∏ → X S  is defined by  
PS x( )= xS ∈ X S x iS ∈ Pi x( )∀i ∈ S{ }. 
In other words, P S x( ) is the set of consumption assignments xS = x iS( )
i∈S  which are 
unanimously preferred to x  by the members of the coalition S . In order to define the 
productive power of the coalition S , it is assumed that the coalition has the technology set 
Y S =
j ∈J
∑ θijY j
i∈S
∑  as production set. This kind of assumption, whose economic meaning is 
controversial, relies on the idea that the relative profit-shares θij reflect consumers’ stock 
holdings which represent proprietorships of production possibilities.  
ˆ X S = x S ∈ X S ∃y ∈ Y S, x iS = ω i + y
i∈I
∑
i∈I
∑   

 
is the set of all feasible consumption assignments for the coalition S  (resp . feasible with free-
disposal consumption assignments if the equality is replaced by a large inequality). 
Obviously, ˆ X = ˆ X I ; the set of feasible consumption allocations is the set of feasible 
consumption assignments for the grand coalition I , that is the coalition of all consumers. 
 
A coalition S  blocks the feasible consumption allocation x  if there is some xS ∈ ˆ X S ∩ PS x( ). 
The core of the economy E  is the set of all feasible consumption allocations blocked by no 
coalition. Notice that a feasible consumption allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is 
not blocked by the grand coalition. An element of the core is thus a Pareto optimal 
consumption allocation. 
 
Replica economies and limit-core concepts 
 
Let r  be any positive integer. The r -replica of E  is the economy composed of r  sub-
economies identical to the original one 
  E
r = X iq ,P iq ,ω iq( )i∈I ,q=1,K ,r, Y j ′ q ( )j ∈J , ′ q =1,K ,r, θiqj ′ q ( )i∈I , j ∈J ,q, ′ q =1,K ,r( ) 
defined as follows: 
• For each j ∈ J , r  producers of type j  have the same production set Y j, ′ q = Y j , 
• For each i ∈ I , r  consumers of type i  have the same consumption set X iq = X i  and 
the same initial endowment ω iq = ω i , 
• For externalities in preferences and profit shares, each consumer is restricted within 
his sub-economy: Piq : X i
i∈I
∏ → X i is defined by P iq x( )= Pi x( ), θiqjq = θij , θiqj ′ q = 0  if 
q ≠ ′q . 
 
In E r, a consumption assignment 
  
xr ∈ X iq
i∈I ,q=1,K ,r
∏  is said to have the equal treatment property 
if for every i ∈ I , x iq = x i  for all   q =1,K ,r . As easily verified, such a consumption 
assignment x r  is feasible in E r if and only if x = x i( )
i∈I  is a feasible consumption allocation 
in the original economy E .  
In this paragraph, we are interested in the set Cr E( ) of the feasible consumption allocations 
x  of the original economy whose r -replica xr  belongs to the core of E r. For a feasible 
consumption allocation x  in the original economy, and provided that each Y j  is convex, this 
is equivalent to the following condition: there is no coalition  S ⊂ I × 1,K ,r{ }in E r with some 
consumption assignment xS  such that 
x iqS − S i( )ω i
i∈S
∑
i,q( )∈S
∑ ∈ S i( ) θijY j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑  
x iqS ∈ Pi x( )∀ i,q( )∈ S  
where   S i( ):= q ∈ 1,K ,r{ } i,q( )∈ S{ } is the set of consumers of type i  who belong to the 
coalition S  and S i( )  denotes the number of elements of S i( ). 
Let us define ti =
S i( )
r
, t = ti( )i∈I , and set for each i  such that ti > 0, x it = 1S i( ) x
iqS
q ∈S i( )
∑ . The 
scalar ti  is a rational number in 0,1[ ] which can be thought of as the rate of participation of i  
in the coalition t  and x it  is the mean consumption that consumer i  achieves by participating 
in the coalition. Assuming that all consumption and production sets are convex and all 
preference correspondences are convex-valued, we thus can replace the above relations by 
tix
it − ti
i∈I
∑
i ti >0{ }
∑ ω i ∈ ti θijY j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑  
x it ∈ P i x( )∀i : ti > 0. 
The existence of some xS  satisfying the first two relations is obviously equivalent to the 
existence  of some x t  satisfying the two last ones and Cr E( ) is the set of all feasible 
consumption allocations x  in the original economy such that there exists no coalition t , t ≠ 0, 
with some consumption assignment x tsatisfying these relations.  
 
Let us now define 
  
Ce E( )= Cr E( )
r≥1
I . A feasible consumption allocation   x ∈ Cr E( )r≥1I  will 
be said to be an Edgeworth equilibrium of E  or to belong to its Debreu–Scarf core. 
 
Clearly, Cr+1 E( )⊂ Cr E( ) and the feasible consumption allocation x  is an Edgeworth 
equilibrium if and only if there is no vector t = ti( )i∈I  of rational rates of participation 
belonging to the interval 0,1[ ], t ≠ 0, with some x it ∈ X i for each i ∈ I , satisfying the above 
relations. Allowing as Aubin that the rates of participation take any real value in the interval 
0,1[ ], we will say that the feasible consumption allocation x  of the original economy belongs 
to the fuzzy core C f E( ) of this economy if there is no vector t ∈ 0,1[ ]I , t ≠ 0, with some 
x it ∈ X i, i ∈ I , satisfying the same relations. 
 
4.2. Non-emptiness results 
 
In the two first following results, the economy E  under consideration is an economy for 
which are specified neither the distribution among consumers of the total initial endowment 
nor the relative profit-shares of consumers on the different firms. 
The existence of a Pareto optimal allocation when preference correspondences have convex 
values and open lower sections is an easy consequence of an elementary fixed-point theorem. 
 
Proposition 3 An economy E  has Pareto optimal allocations under the following conditions: 
1. The set ˆ X  of all feasible (resp. feasible with free-disposal) consumption allocations is 
nonempty, convex and compact 
2. For each i ∈ I , the correspondence Pi : X h
h ∈I
∏ → X i is convex-valued 
3. For each i ∈ I  and for every zi ∈ Xi, the set Pi( )−1 zi( ):= x ∈ X zi ∈ Pi x( ){ } is open 
in X . 
 
Remarkably, when each Pi corresponds to the strict preference associated to a complete 
preorder ≥i of consumer i  on his consumption set X i, the convexity of the feasible set and of 
the values of the preference correspondences is not needed for the existence of strong Pareto 
optimal allocations  
 
Proposition 4 If ˆ X  is nonempty and compact, under the conditions 3 of the previous 
proposition, an economy E  whose consumers have complete preference preorders on their 
consumption sets has strong Pareto optimal allocation (and, a fortiori, Pareto optimal 
allocations). 
 
To understand this, it suffices to associate to each complete preorder of preferences ≥i an 
upper semi-continuous utility function ui : X i → R  and to define u x( )= λiui
i∈I
∑ x i( ) for a 
system λ = λi( ) of strictly positive relative weights for each consumer. A maximum x  of the 
function u  on ˆ X  corresponds to a strong Pareto optimal allocation. 
 
Let us now consider a private ownership economy E  as defined in Section 2 and let ˆ X  be the 
set of all feasible (resp. feasible with free-disposal) consumption allocations. The non-
emptiness of Cr E( ) for any positive integer r  is proved under the following assumptions: 
1. The set ˆ X  is compact. Moreover,  for each i ∈ I ,  
(a) X i is convex, 
(b) For each x i ∈ X i , Pi( )−1 x i( ) is open in X = X h
h ∈I
∏ , 
(c) For each x ∈ X , P i x( ) is convex and x i ∉ Pi x( ), 
(d) ω i ∈ X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑  (resp. 
 
ω i ∈ X i − θijY j
j ∈J
∑ + R+l  in case of free-disposal); 
2. For each j ∈ J , Y j  is convex. 
 
Notice that the survival assumption 1(d) can be interpreted as an autarky assumption: for each 
consumer i , the coalition i{} reduced to this consumer alone has a nonempty feasible set 
ˆ X i{ }. 
 
Rephrasing the previous assumptions, let us call convex economy an economy whose 
consumption sets and production sets are convex and preference correspondences have 
convex values. We have the following:  
 
Proposition 5 Let E  be a convex economy. If the set ˆ X  of feasible consumption assignments 
is compact and if each consumer satisfies the autarky assumption and has preference 
correspondences with open lower sections in X , then for any positive integer r , Cr E( )≠ ∅. 
 
The proof of Proposition 5 is based on a fixed point argument. When consumers’ preferences 
correspond to complete preorders on their consumption set, a proof can be based on the Scarf 
theorem of non-emptiness of the core of a NTU game. 
 
Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, it is easily verified that Cr E( ) is a closed subset of 
ˆ X . It was previously noticed that for all r ≥1, Cr+1 E( )⊂ Cr E( ). Coming back to the 
definition of 
  
Ce E( )= Cr E( )
r≥1
I , it follows from an obvious compactness argument that the 
Debreu–Scarf core, that is the set of Edgeworth equilibria, is nonempty. 
 
Proposition 6 Let E  be a convex economy. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 5, 
the set Ce E( ) is nonempty. 
 
To get the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of the economy E , one adds the following 
continuity assumption: 
3. For each i ∈ I , for every x ∈ ˆ X , the set P i x( ) is open in X i. 
Then, exploiting the density in 0,1[ ]I  of the subset of all elements of 0,1[ ]I  with rational 
coordinates, one gets the following: 
 
Proposition 7 For an economy E  satisfying the conditions 1–3, the fuzzy core is nonempty. 
 
When consumers’ preferences are represented by utility functions on their consumption set, 
the previous proposition can be translated into: 
 
Proposition 8 For a convex economy whose set of feasible consumption assignments is 
compact and consumers satisfy the autarky assumption and have continuous (quasi-concave) 
utility functions, the fuzzy core is nonempty. 
 
4.3 Price-decentralization results 
 
For a private ownership economy, it follows from the definitions that an equilibrium 
consumption assignment is an element of the fuzzy core, thus an Edgeworth equilibrium, an 
element of the core and a Pareto optimal feasible consumption allocation. 
 
Proposition 9 Let x , y , p ( )∈ X i × Y j × S
j ∈J
∏
i∈I
∏  be an equilibrium of a private ownership 
economy E . Then x  is an element of C f E( ). 
 
Indeed, assume on the contrary that there exist t ∈ 0,1[ ]I , t ≠ 0, and x t ∈ X i
i t i >0{ }
∏  such that 
tix
it − ti
i∈I
∑
i ti >0{ }
∑ ω i ∈ ti θijY j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑  
x it ∈ P i x( )∀i : ti > 0. 
From the first relation and the equilibrium definition, we deduce 
p . tix
it − tiω i∑
i∈I ti >0{ }
∑ 
 
  
 
 
  ≤ p . ti θij y j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑ . 
From the second relation and the equilibrium definition, we deduce 
p .x it > p .ω i + θij p .y j∑  for each i  such that ti > 0  
and  
p . tix
it − tiω i∑
i∈I ti >0{ }
∑ 
 
  
 
 
  > p . ti θij y j
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑ , 
a contradiction. 
 
The previous proposition is not surprising. The optimality, core and limit-core definitions 
were tailor–made for this result. 
On the contrary, the price-decentralization results that we will state as converse results are 
celebrated theorems of general equilibrium theory. 
 
The second welfare theorem 
By price-decentralization of a Pareto optimal allocation x, y( )∈ X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  we mean the 
definition of a price vector p ∈ S  such that 
•  For each i ∈ I , x i ∈ Pi x( )⇒ p.x i ≥ p.x i , 
• For each j ∈ J , y j ∈ Y j ⇒ p.y j ≤ p.y j . 
If p ∈ S  satisfies these two conditions, we say that x, y( ) is a quasi-equilibrium allocation 
relative to the price system p , or that p  is a price equilibrium with transfers. 
 
Theorem 2 Let x, y( ) be a Pareto optimal allocation of an economy E  whose are specified 
neither the distribution of the total resources ω  nor the relative profit-shares of consumers in 
the different producers. Under the conditions: 
1. For each i ∈ I , the preferred set P i x( ) is convex and x i ∈ Pi x( ) (the closure of 
P i x( )), 
2. The total production set Y = Y j
j ∈J
∑  is convex, 
there exists p ∈ S  such that x, y( ) is a quasi-equilibrium allocation relative to the price 
system p . 
 
The proof of Theorem 2 is done using a separation argument in  R l  for the two disjoint 
nonempty convex sets Pi x( )− Y j −ω
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑    


  and 0{ } (resp.  −R+l  in case of free-disposal). 
Let p ≠ 0 be such that 
• p. Pi x( )− Y j −ω
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑    
 
 
  ≥ 0  (no-disposal case) 
• 
  
p. Pi x( )− Y j −ω
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑    
 
 
  ≥ p. −R+l( ) (free-disposal case). 
In both cases, we get p. Pi x( )− x i( )− Y j − y j( )
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑    
 
 
  ≥ 0, which, with the local non-satiation 
assumption made at each component of x  completes the proof. There is no loss of generality 
to assume that p ∈ S . Notice in addition that, in case of free-disposal,  p. −R+l( )≤ 0 implies 
p ≥ 0 and p. x i − y
j ∈J
∑ j − ω i
i∈I
∑
i∈I
∑    
 
 
  = 0   
 
The economic meaning of the second welfare theorem is the following: If x ,y ( ) is a Pareto 
optimal allocation of E  where each consumer is locally non-satiated, there exists a price 
vector p such that x,y, p( ) is a quasi-equilibrium of the private ownership economy ′E  
obtained from E  by giving to each consumer i  the initial endowment ω i = x i − 1
I
y
j ∈J
∑ j  and 
the profit shares θij = 1I . In other words, the responsibility of a benevolent planner can be 
limited to the choice between different social (Pareto) optima and to implementing the 
distributions of resources and profit shares associated with the chosen optimum. 
 
The equivalence theorem 
We now start from a feasible allocation x, y( )∈ X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  of a private ownership 
economy E  such that x ∈ C f E( ), the fuzzy core of E . 
 
Theorem 3 Let x, y( )∈ X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏  be a feasible allocation of a private ownership 
economy E  such that x ∈ C f E( ). Under the conditions: 
1. For each i ∈ I , the preferred set P i x( ) is convex and x i ∈ Pi x( ), 
2. For each j ∈ J , the production set Y j is convex, 
there exists p ∈ S  such that x, y, p( ) is a quasi-equilibrium of E . 
 
As for the second welfare theorem, the proof is done using a separation argument between the 
two nonempty convex sets 
  
co Pi x( )− θijY j −ω i
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
  
i∈I
U    


 and 0{ } (resp.  −R+l ). It follows from 
the fact that x ∈ C f E( ) that the sets are disjoints. Let p ≠ 0 be such that 
• For each i ∈ I , p. Pi x i( )− θijY j −ω i
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
  ≥ 0  (no-disposal case) 
• For each i ∈ I , 
  
p. Pi x( )− θijY j −ω i
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
  ≥ p. −R+l( ) (free-disposal case). 
In both cases, for each i ∈ I , p.Pi x( )≥ p. Y j + p.ω i
j ∈J
∑ . Using the local non-satiation at each 
component of the consumption feasible allocation and summing over i , one gets successively 
p. x
i − y j − ω i
i∈I
∑
j ∈J
∑
i∈I
∑    
 
 
  = 0 , p.x
i = p.ω i + θij
j ∈J
∑ p.y j∀i ∈ I , p.Y j ≤ p.y j∀j ∈ J , 
p.Pi x( )≥ p.x i,∀i ∈ I , and the proof is complete. Notice, as in the second welfare theorem, 
that, in the free-disposal case, p ≥ 0. 
 
The economic interpretation of this theorem is that the core of an economy shrinks to the set 
of equilibrium allocations when the number of consumers tends to infinity and the market 
power of each of them tends to zero. This idea that traces back to Edgeworth is  probably 
better formalized with the equivalence theorem for continuum economies. 
 
One of the main interests of the previous theorem is elsewhere. Adding the equivalence 
theorem to the non-emptiness result for the fuzzy core yields an alternative  but close 
statement and a fourth proof of the existence of equilibrium in private ownership economies. 
We leave the reader to formulate this equilibrium existence result.  
 
5. Uniqueness properties of equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium defined until now has no reason to be unique, so that general equilibrium 
theory until now is not deterministic. Some examples show that there may even exist a 
continuum of equilibrium prices. In this section, we look at conditions which guarantee 
uniqueness or at least local uniqueness of equilibrium.  
 
In order to apply general equilibrium to comparative statics analysis or to examine the 
dynamic behavior of general equilibrium systems, uniqueness of equilibrium would be the 
most desirable property. It is generally admitted that uniqueness of equilibrium requires 
strong additional properties of the aggregate excess demand as the gross substitute property 
or the satisfaction of the (revealed preference) weak axiom. The plausibility of these 
properties is controversial and still discussed. 
 
We will first establish in this section local uniqueness of equilibrium as a “generic” (in a 
sense to be made precise below) property of the classical model depending on the parameters 
of the model. In order to state easily understandable statements, we will stay voluntarily 
below the current state-of-the-art in this question. In particular, we will restrict the analysis to 
exchange economies where consumers have utility functions defined on consumption sets 
identical to the positive orthant   R+l  of the commodity space and strictly positive initial 
endowments. Considering consumer’s tastes as fixed and individual resources as variable, we 
parametrize by the vector ω = ω i( )
i∈I  of the strictly positive initial consumer’s endowments 
the economies under considerations and make on the exchange economy E ω( )= X i,ui,ω i( )
i∈I  
the following assumptions: 
 
For each i ∈ I ,  
(a)   X i = R+l  and ω i >> 0  
(b)   ui : R+l → R  is continuous on  R+l , twice continuously differentiable on   R++l , the 
interior of   R+l , with in addition: 
(c) ui is differentiably strictly increasing, that is, for all  x i ∈ R++l , 
∇ui x i( )>> 0  
(d) ui is differentiably strictly quasi-concave, that is, 
 ∇ui x i( ).v = 0 ⇒ vD2ui x i( )v < 0,∀x i ∈ R++l ,∀v ∈ R l : v ≠ 0  
(e) For each i ∈ I  and for any u ∈ R+* , the closure of the set  x
i ∈ R++l ui x i( )≥ u{ } is 
contained in   R++l . 
 
It easily follows from Theorem 1 and the different above assumptions that E ω( ) has an 
equilibrium x , p ( ) with, necessarily, p >> 0 and  x ∈ R++l( )I . Without loss of generality 
p ∈ ri ∆( ), the relative interior of the unit-simplex of  R l . On the other hand, if   p ∈ R++l , 
letting for each i ∈ I , wi = p.ω i , the budget set  α
i p,wi( )= x i ∈ R+l p.x i ≤ wi{ } is compact and 
the demand set  
x i p,wi( )= x i ∈ α i p,wi( )ui x i( )≥ ui z( )∀z ∈ α i p,wi( ){ } 
 is well-defined, actually is a singleton. Each consumer has a continuous demand function on 
  R++l  . Writing the first order conditions for the utility function maximization, one deduces  
from the above assumptions and the implicit function theorem that each demand function is 
also differentiable, satisfies p.x i p,wi( )= wi  (Walras law) and .that if the sequence pν ,wiν( ) 
in ri ∆( )× R+*  converges to p,w( ) with p ∉ ri ∆( ), w ∈ R+* , then x i p,w( )  converges to +∞ .  
By definition, given   ω ∈ R++l( )I , p ∈ ri ∆( ) is an equilibrium price vector of E ω( ) if and only 
if x i p,ω( )= ω i
i∈I
∑
i∈I
∑ .  The set of such price vectors is denoted by W ω( ) 
 
The main result of this section is the following: 
 
Theorem 4 Under the above assumptions, the set W ω( ) is finite, except for a (relatively) 
closed subset of   R++l( )I  with Lebesgue measure zero in  R l( )I . Moreover, on some 
neighborhood of ω  outside of this exceptional set, equilibrium prices are continuously 
differentiable functions of the vector of individual initial resources. 
 
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on the application of Sard’s theorem and of the inverse 
function theorem to the function   F : ri ∆( )× R+* × R++l( )I −1 → Rl( )I  defined by: 
  
F p,w1,ω 2,K ,ω I( )= x1 p,w1( )+ x i p, p.ω i( )− ω i
i≠1
∑
i≠1
∑   
 
  ,ω
2,K ,ω I 
 
  


  
and on the remark that  p ∈ W ω( )⇔ F p, p.ω1,ω 2,K ,ω I( )= ω . 
 
We will not enter in the details of Debreu’s proof whose main steps are: 
• The set C  of the   ω = F p, p.ω
1,ω 2,K ω I( ) such that the Jacobian matrix of F  at 
  p, p.ω
1,ω 2,K ,ω I( ) has rank smaller than  l I  has Lebesgue measure zero; 
•   C ∩ R++l( )I  is closed relative to  R++l( )I   • Outside the set C , W ω( ) is finite and each equilibrium is locally unique. 
One says that equilibrium is locally determinate outside the exceptional set C . 
 
A result which is verified on a open and of full Lebesgue measure subset of the set of initial 
data is said to be generic. Genericity analysis and the use of differential analysis have been 
extended to production economies, to more general formalizations of the preference of the 
agents, and also from the point of view of the dependence of equilibrium prices on the other 
primitive data of the model. Besides obvious differential assumptions on the characteristics of 
the agents, such an analysis requires in general strong assumptions on the model that contrast 
with the generality researched in the part of general equilibrium analysis which deals with 
existence and optimality of equilibrium. 
 
However, because they open a room for comparative statics and dynamic equilibrium studies, 
genericity analysis belong to general equilibrium theory not only for the classical model but 
also for its extensions. 
 
6. Extensions of the classical model 
 
The list of commodities, the list of agents, the ubiquitous convexity assumptions delineate the 
economic context the general equilibrium model is supposed to deal with. The same is true for 
other properties of the characteristics of the agents and the definition of their behavior. In this 
section, we indicate at what extent discarding one or another assumption of the classical 
model changes its conclusions about equilibrium existence and the ability of market 
equilibrium to yield Pareto optimal allocations.  
 
6.1. Extension to infinitely many commodities, to a continuum of agents 
 
Infinite dimensional economies 
In general equilibrium, a commodity is described not only by its physical properties but also 
by the date, the location and the state of nature that precise the conditions of its availability. 
The classical general equilibrium model hypothesis of a finite number of commodities implies 
that the economic activity extends over finitely many dates, locations and events. Such an 
hypothesis limits dramatically the application of the results to understanding the real 
economic life. 
 
Assume on the contrary that, from the point of view of their physical properties, there are  l  
different goods (or services) but that a commodity bundle should specify the quantity of each 
good depending on (possibly) infinitely many dates, locations or states of nature. Such a 
statement suggests that a commodity bundle should be a vector-valued function and that an 
admissible commodity space should be a function space. Actually, on a measure space 
Ω,Σ,µ( ) formalizing time or uncertainty or on the interval 0,1[ ] with its Lebesgue measure, 
spaces   Lpl Ω,Σ,µ( ),   Lpl 0,1[ ], 1≤ p ≤ ∞, are among the most currently used commodity spaces 
in economics. As usual, two measurable functions from Ω to  R l  which coincide µ -almost 
everywhere on Ω (resp. two measurable functions from 0,1[ ] to  R l  ) are considered as the 
same function. Spaces  L∞l Ω,Σ,µ( ) (resp.  L∞l 0,1[ ]), that are spaces of (classes of) essentially 
bounded measurable functions, are relevant to the allocation of resources over time or states 
of nature. Spaces   Lpl Ω,Σ,µ( ) (resp.   Lpl 0,1[ ] ), p ≥1, that are spaces of (classes of) p-
integrable measurable functions, arise in Finance or in any uncertainty setting where mean, 
variance or eventually the moments of superior order of commodity bundles matter. 
 
On the other hand, the physical properties of a commodity can vary continuously depending 
on some characteristics. In such a setting, a commodity can be defined as a point in a space K  
of characteristics, for example its location or its content of more fundamental  constitutive 
elements. The space of characteristics is equipped with a metric defining closeness of 
commodities. The definition of commodity bundles as measures on this space corresponds to 
the idea that commodities with close characteristics should be considered as close substitutes. 
The space M K( ) of all finite countably additive signed measures on a compact metric space 
of characteristics is used in models of location or for the analysis of commodity 
differentiation. In this setting, a point of K  is to be understood as the complete description of 
a unit of a commodity. A commodity bundle is not a function from K  to some vector space 
but a finite measure on K , that is a countably additive function m : B K( )→ R from the Borel 
σ  -field of subsets of K  to R; for B ∈ B K( ), m B( ) denotes the number of units of 
commodities having characteristics in B. 
 
A price vector is a linear functional on the commodity space and the price space is a vector 
space in duality with the commodity space, thus a subspace of its algebraic dual. In the 
previous examples, good candidates as price spaces are the norm duals of the corresponding 
commodity spaces, and also the pre-duals  L1l Ω,Σ,µ( ),  L1l 0,1[ ] of  L∞l Ω,Σ,µ( ),   L∞l 0,1[ ] and 
C K( ), the space of continuous real functions defined on K , the pre-dual of M K( ).  
 
One time defined a commodity-price duality L, ′ L , as in the classical model, a private 
ownership economy is given by 
E = L, ′ L , X i,P i,ω i( )i∈I , Y j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
where X i, Y j  are now subsets of L  and ω i ∈ L . Feasible, Pareto optimal, core and fuzzy core 
allocations are defined as in the classical model. The same is true for quasi-equilibrium and 
equilibrium, with the exception that the price vector is now an element of ′L . 
 
When the commodity space is an L∞-type space (characterized by non-emptiness of the 
interior of the positive cone and by the existence of a pre-dual), one has the following 
equilibrium existence result where open lower sections of preference correspondences and 
compactness of attainable sets are stated using the weak-star topology relative to the pre-dual 
of the commodity space while the other topological assumptions use the norm topology of the 
commodity space. In the following proposition, if τ  is a topology on all X i, τ I  denotes the 
product topology on their Cartesian product. 
 
Proposition 10 Assume either free-disposal or that at least one consumer’s preference 
correspondence has open values. The economy has a quasi-equilibrium with a price in the 
dual of the commodity space under the following assumptions: 
1. For each i ∈ I , 
(a) X iis convex, 
(b) Pi has σ I L∞,L1( )-open lower sections and norm-open convex values with 
x i ∉ Pi x( ), 
(c) The autarky condition is satisfied (eventually with free disposal), 
(e) For every feasible allocation x,y( ), x i ∈ Pi x( ), the closure of the preferred set; 
2. For each j ∈ J , Y j  is convex; 
3. ˆ X  is σ I L∞,L1( )-compact. 
The quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium if  
• either the interiority assumption which defines strong survival is satisfied for every 
consumer 
• or the interiority assumption is satisfied for the whole economy and the economy is 
irreducible. 
 
Notice that a price in the dual of an L∞-type space is of difficult economic interpretation. 
Obtaining a quasi-equilibrium or an equilibrium with a price in the pre-dual of the commodity 
space requires additional assumptions. 
 
 Proposition 10 or any analogous equilibrium existence result for an economy whose 
commodity space is of the same type can be proved using any of the three main approaches to 
the equilibrium existence problem. It can even be proved using, as in the proof published by 
Bewley in 1972, a limiting-process on the equilibria of a net of finite dimensional economies 
satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. Maybe, the limitation to L∞-type commodity spaces 
will be better understood looking at the equilibrium existence proof, used in this survey, based 
on price decentralization of elements of the fuzzy core. 
 
Indeed, non-emptiness of the fuzzy core of a private ownership economy can be obtained, 
using the same arguments as in Propositions 3–4–5–6–7, provided that, in their assumptions, 
the weak-star topology of the commodity space relative to its pre-dual replaces the original 
topology for formulating compactness assumptions and the openness of lower sections of 
preference correspondences.  
 
In counterpart, the price decentralization of the elements of the fuzzy core uses a separation 
argument which requires, when the commodity space is infinite dimensional, that either the 
positive orthant of the commodity space (in case of free-disposal) or the set 
  
Pi x( )− θijY j −ω i
j ∈J
∑    



i∈I
U  have a non-empty interior. Non-emptiness of the interior of the 
positive orthant is obviously a characteristic of the L∞-type spaces but not of the other 
commodity space referred to as possible commodity spaces in infinite dimensional 
economies. This interiority assumption is also required if the openness of values for some Pi 
is guaranteed by some monotonicity assumption of this correspondence or if the consumption 
sets are assumed to be bounded below. 
 
In the absence of interiority assumptions, usual equilibrium existence proofs rely on 
properness assumptions on the characteristics of the economy whose role is to restore the 
missing interiority, and on lattice theoretic assumptions on the commodity space and/or the 
price space. In addition, consumption sets are assumed to coincide with the positive orthant.  
 
Notice immediately that, when endowed with their canonical order, the examples of 
commodity spaces given in this section and their duals or pre-duals are ordered vector spaces 
and more precisely vector lattices or Riesz spaces. It is not anymore the case when the 
commodity space is re-ordered by an ordering more significant in some economic contexts.  
 
A thorough study of the different properness assumptions to be found in the literature would 
go far beyond the objective of this contribution. The same is true for the attempts to use 
properness assumptions in economies defined on commodity spaces without lattice structure. 
Such a study, useful for example in models of portfolio trading, is the object of very active 
researches. 
 
Continuum economies 
Let us come back to economies with finitely many commodities. Considering atomless 
measure spaces of agents rather than finite numbers of them formalizes the basic requirement 
that, in a competitive model, individuals have no power to influence market prices. To 
understand how are translated in this new framework the definition and properties of 
equilibrium, let us review the pioneering papers of Aumann. 
 
Consider on   R l  as commodity space an exchange economy with an atomless, positive 
bounded measure space T,Α,ν( ) of agents 
  E = T,Α,ν( ), f t ,ω t( )( )t ∈T( ). 
 For simplicity, we assume that T  is the real interval 0,1[ ], Α  is the Borel σ -algebra of 
subsets of T  and ν  is the Lebesgue measure. Each agent t ∈ T , whose consumption set is the 
positive orthant  X t = R+l , is characterized by the initial endowment  ω t( )∈ R+l  and the (strict) 
preference relation   f t  on   R+l . The function  ω : T,Α,ν( )→ R+l , t → ω t( ), is assumed to be 
integrable.  
Definitions of feasible, equilibrium, core allocations are the same as in the classical model of 
an exchange economy, except that sums over a finite number of individual consumers are 
replaced by Lebesgue vector integrals. An allocation is an integrable function 
  x : T,Α,ν( )→ R+l . The allocation is feasible if xT∫ = ωT∫ , where xT∫  means x t( )T∫ dt . 
A competitive equilibrium is a pair p ,x ( ) consisting of a non-zero price vector p  and a 
feasible allocation x  such that for almost every t ∈ T , x t( ) is optimal with respect to   f t  in 
t ’ s budget set   x ∈ R+
l p.x ≤ p.ω t( ){ }. An equilibrium allocation is an allocation x  for which 
there exists a price vector p  such that p ,x ( ) is a competitive equilibrium. 
A coalition is a Lebesgue measurable subset S  of T  with non-zero Lebesgue measure. An 
allocation y  dominates an allocation x  via a coalition S  if  y t( ) f t x t( ) for each t ∈ S , and S  
is effective for y , that is, y
S
∫ = ω
S
∫ . The core of E  is the set of all feasible allocations that 
are not dominated via any coalition. 
 
Not surprisingly, the firs result is the version of the Edgeworth conjecture given by the 
Aumann equivalence theorem. 
 
Proposition 11 Assume on E  the following conditions: 
 (a) ω
T
∫ >> 0 , 
 (b) For each   y ∈ R+l , the sets  x ∈ R+
l x f t y{ } and  x ∈ R+l y f t x{ } are open in   R+l , 
 (c) In   R+l ,   x > y ⇒ x f t y , 
 (d) If x  and y  are allocations, then the set  t ∈ T x t( ) f t y t( ){ } is Lebesgue 
measurable in T . 
Then the competitive equilibrium allocations of E are precisely the core allocations of E . 
 
In other words, if preference relations are strictly monotone, continuous and measurable and 
if every commodity is present in the economy, the core coincide with the set of equilibrium 
allocations. 
 
As in the classical model with a finite number of agents, that every equilibrium allocation is 
in the core simply follows from the definition. The proof of the converse statement parallels 
the one given in the classical model for price-decentralization of the elements of the fuzzy 
core (Theorem 3). Using the same notations, if x  is a core allocation and if U ⊂ T  is a set of 
agents, let 
 
GU = co Pt x t( )( )−ω t( )( )
t ∈U
U   

 . It is first proved that there exists a set U , whose 
complement in T  has a zero Lebesgue measure, such that 0 ∉ int GU , the interior of GU . Then 
a separation argument shows the existence of p >> 0 such that p ,x ( ) is a competitive 
equilibrium.  
 
The equilibrium existence result given by Aumann adds to the assumptions (b), (c), (d) of 
Proposition 11 the additional assumption that consumer’s preference relations are complete 
preorders whose   f t  is the strict relation. The equilibrium existence result is thus: 
 
Proposition 12 If consumers’s preference relations are complete preorders on their 
consumption set, then, under the assumptions of Proposition 11, the economy E  has a 
competitive equilibrium. 
 
Because, in particular, no boundedness of the set of feasible allocations allows for 
compactifying the economy, the proof of Proposition 12 is considerably more complex than 
any equilibrium existence proof in the classical model with a finite number of agents, and 
requires a lot of integration theory.  
 
In counterpart, the fact that the set of consumers is a measure space without atoms allows to 
discard convexity of individual preferences, an assumption made neither in Proposition 11, 
nor in Proposition 12. For the proof of Proposition 12, this is due to the definition of the 
integral of a correspondence and to the fact, based on Liapunov’s theorem, that the integral of 
a correspondence from an atomless measure space into  R l  is a convex subset of Rl .  
 
If we add that it is proved by Hildenbrand at the end of his book that for the same economy 
with an unspecified distribution of resources, Pareto optimal allocations exist and can be 
decentralized as quasi-equilibrium allocations relative to a price system, we see that the 
research program and the results for economies with a continuum of agents exactly parallel 
the one for the classical model with a finite number of agents. And, in effect, the results 
reported here have been extended to economies with production, with externalities in 
preferences, and to several other contexts, including economies with atoms, and  “large” 
economies, that is, economies with measure spaces of agents and infinitely many 
commodities.  
 
To conclude this sub-section, it is necessary to emphasize that the full validity of all 
properties of equilibrium is depending on the continuum hypothesis (the space of agents is an 
atomless, positive bounded measure space). In economies with countably many agents, whose 
overlapping generations economies are the most significant example, equilibrium allocations 
which are shown to exist, are not necessarily Pareto optimal. Sufficient conditions, for 
example on the relation of the equilibrium price with the distribution of individual resources, 
exist for Pareto optimality of equilibrium. 
 
6.2. Some market failures 
 
We turn now to extensions of the classical model to contexts in which some of the 
assumptions of the classical model do not hold and market equilibrium, when it exists, cannot 
be relied on to yield Pareto optimal outcomes. It is that we mean by market failures. 
  
In what follows, we will treat only three examples. The two first ones correspond to long-
standing problems of economic policy related with the second welfare theorem: how to 
regulate firms which produce with increasing returns so as to achieve Pareto optimal states in 
a decentralized way? How to optimize the production and the provision of public goods? In 
each case, the solution is found in the definition of a new equilibrium concept which coincide 
with the classical one under the conditions of the classical model. The third example, raised in 
the context of an increasing role of market institutions, is maybe the translation in the theory 
of a massive phenomena of the real modern economies: the prevalence of the role of financial 
markets. 
 
Non-convex economies 
As just stated, the interest for non-convex economies arises on the production side from the 
consideration of increasing returns to scale and/or certain externalities. On the consumption 
side, besides all forms of indivisibilities which have given rise to a wide literature and that we 
postulate away in this paragraph, non-convex preferences correspond to anti-
complementarities between commodities, for example to non-aversion to risk for agents 
facing uncertainty. 
When preferred and production sets are non-convex, it is well known that Pareto optimal 
allocations of the economy are no longer equilibria for a price-system where consumers 
would optimize their preferences under their budget constraint and producers would 
maximize their profit. Statements of the second welfare theorem for a non-convex economy 
E = X i,Pi( )i∈I , Y y( )j ∈J ,ω( ), where individual resources are non specified, have been provided, 
starting with a seminal paper by Guesnerie. They are proved using a separation argument 
which parallels the proof of Theorem 2, replacing the normal cone of convex analysis by a 
definition of normal cone borrowed from non-smooth and non-convex analysis. Roughly 
speaking, they state that if x ,y ( ) is a feasible allocation where consumers are locally non-
satiated, then there exist a price vector p ≠ 0  such that 
−p ∈ N
P i x ( ) x 
i( ),∀i ∈ I  and p ∈ NY j y j( ),∀j ∈ J , 
where NX x( ) denotes the normal cone to a set X  at a point x ∈ X , for some definition of 
this notion. Writing −p ∈ N
P i x ( ) x 
i( ) in place of p .P i x ( )≥ p.x i  as stated in Theorem 2, and 
p ∈ N
Y j
y j( ) in place of p .Y j ≤ p .y j , we see that the notion of normal cone generalizes the 
definition of normal cone in convex analysis. It generalizes also the first order conditions for 
Pareto optimality that we would write for an economy with differentiable utility and 
production functions. 
 
We will not give a precise mathematical definition of the normal cone. Actually, several 
alternative definitions allow for the above characterization of feasible Pareto optimal 
allocations. Depending on the assumptions made on the production  sets, each of them has a 
different implication for the economic significance of the price-decentralization result. For 
non convex preferences, economists prefer to use the Shapley–Folkman theorem to exhibit an 
approximate expenditure minimizing behavior. For production with increasing returns, 
Clarke’s normal cone, considered as a generalization of the marginal cost pricing rule, is most 
often used. What should be understood is that, whatever be the chosen notion, in order to 
decentralize Pareto optimal allocations of a  non-convex economy, non-convex firms must be 
instructed to behave in conformity with the (necessary) conditions of Pareto-optimality. 
  
This idea will help us to understand the model and the equilibrium concept used for non-
convex economies.  From now on, we restrict ourselves to economies where only production 
sets may be non convex. Let 
E = X i,≥i,ω i,ri( )
i∈I , Y
j ,φ j( )
j ∈J( ) 
be an economy almost standardly defined.  
For each consumer i ∈ I , the function 
 
ri : Y j
j ∈J
∏ × R l → R , continuous, homogeneous of 
degree one with respect to the price vector, and satisfying ri
i∈I
∑ y, p( )= p. y j + ω i
i∈I
∑
j ∈J
∑    


, 
defines the wealth of consumer i . This definition obviously encompasses the particular case 
ri y, p( )= p.ω i + θij p.y j
j ∈J
∑ for consumer’s wealth in a classical private ownership economy 
where producers maximize profit. A more general structure of revenues, on which will be 
done survival assumptions, is necessary in an economy with non-profit maximizing producers 
where survival of consumers at equilibrium is not anymore a consequence of the autarky  
assumptions made in private ownership economies.  
For each producer j ∈ J ,   φ j :∂Y y → R+l  is the pricing rule followed by the producer. In view 
of a free-disposal assumption made for each producer in this model, the pricing rule 
associates a set of non-negative prices to efficient production plans of the producer. The 
interest of the notion of pricing rule is to be compatible with various behaviors that are 
currently considered in the economics literature; profit maximization, but also average or 
marginal cost pricing rules.  
 
A pair 
  
p, y( )∈ R+l × ∂Y j
j ∈J
∏  such that for every j ∈ J , p ∈ φ j y j( ) is called production 
equilibrium. 
 
An equilibrium of E  is a t-uple x ,y , p ( ) in 
 
X i
i∈I
∏ × Y j
j ∈J
∏ × R l  such that p ≠ 0  and 
1. Each consumer optimizes his preferences in his budget set 
2. For every j ∈ J , p ∈ φ j y j( ) 
3. All markets clear, that is, x i
i∈I
∑ = ω i
i∈I
∑ + y j
j ∈J
∑ . 
 
Usual assumptions guarantee compactness of all feasible sets. Besides local non-satiation of 
consumers, the already mentioned assumption of free-disposal in all production sets (Y j  is 
closed, contains 0 and   Y j − R+l ⊂ Y j ), and a strong survival assumption made as well for the 
whole economy as for individual consumers: if p,y( ) is a production equilibrium, then 
p. y j + ω i
i∈I
∑
j ∈J
∑    
 
 
  > inf p. X i
i∈I
∑  and for each i ∈ I , ri y, p( )> inf p.X i  
the key assumption concerns the correspondences φ j  assumed to have a closed graph and 
values equal to closed convex cones not reduced to 0{ }, an assumption verified in particular 
by the Clarke normal cone.  
Under the additional assumption that the pricing rule of each producer has bounded losses, the 
non-convex economy E  has an equilibrium.  
 
Public goods 
A good is said to be a (pure) public good (by opposition to a private good) when consumption 
of a unit of the good by one agent does not prevent its availability to other consumers.  
 
In order to introduce pure public goods in the general equilibrium model, let us consider a 
private ownership economy where finitely many firms, owned by consumers as in the 
classical model, jointly produce private and public goods. Finitely many consumers have an 
initial endowment of private goods only and jointly consume private goods and a same 
amount of public goods. If   l  is the finite number of private goods and k  is the finite number 
of public goods, the economy is thus described by 
 
  E = R
l × Rk,R l × Rk , X i,ui,ω i( )i∈I , Y j( )j ∈J , θij( )i∈I , j ∈J( ) 
 
where   R l × Rk ,Rl × Rk  is the commodity–price duality of the model, and for each i ∈ I , 
  ω i = ei,0( )∈ R l × 0{ } is his initial endowment and  ui : R l × Rk → R his utility function 
depending on his joint consumption of private and public goods. Two equilibrium concepts 
make sense for such a model, with different consequences on optimality of equilibrium. 
 
Private provision equilibrium 
A first equilibrium concept emphasizes the personal decision of each consumer to provide 
some amount of public goods that all consumers buy at a same market price. The utility a 
consumer gets from his composite vector of private goods consumption–public goods 
provision depends simultaneously on his private goods consumption and on the total 
provision of public goods by all consumers. Charities, subscriptions are examples of such a 
private provision. 
If we set x i, xg
i( ) for a consumption–private provision vector of i , y j , ygj( ) for a production 
vector of j , p, pg( ) for a market price vector, a private provision equilibrium of E  is a t-uple  
x
i
, x g
i( )
i∈I
, y
j
, yg
j( )
j ∈J
, p, pg( )     
in 
  
R+
l × R+k( )I × Y j
j ∈J
∏ × R l × Rk( ) such that p, pg( )≠ 0,0( ) and: 
1. For each i ∈ I , x i, x gi( ) maximizes ui x i,xgi + xgh
h≠ i
∑   

  in the budget set 
  
Bi p, pg( )= x i,xgi( )∈ R+l × R+k p.x i + pg .xgi ≤ p.ei + θij p.y j + pg .ygj( )
j ∈J
∑     
 
  
  
 
2. For each j ∈ J  and for all y j , ygj( )∈ Y j , p.y j + pg .ygj ≤ p.y j + pg .ygj  
3. x
i
, x g
i( )
i∈I
∑ = ei,0( )
i∈I
∑ + y j , ygj( )
j ∈J
∑ .  
 
For a private provision quasi-equilibrium, the first condition is replaced by: 
1’. For each i ∈ I , ui x i,xgi + x gh
h≠ i
∑   
 
  > u x
i
,x g
i + xgh
h≠ i
∑   

  
implies p.x i + pg .xgi ≥ p.x i + pg .x gi . 
 
 
Because, in their appreciation of a composite vector of consumption of private goods–private 
provision of public goods, consumers take as given the private provisions of public goods of 
the other consumers, this model is a particular case of the classical model where this type of 
externalities in preferences was assumed. Quasi-equilibrium existence thus follows from 
quasi-equilibrium existence in the classical model, under analogous assumptions which 
require some local non-satiation assumption in terms of private or public goods.  
 
Assume moreover that there exists some y, yg( )∈ Y j
j ∈J
∑  with yg >> 0 , that is, there is 
possible to produce simultaneously a strictly positive quantity of each public good. Then the 
strong survival assumption for the whole economy is satisfied and, if consumers’ utility 
functions are  continuous and under some irreducibility condition on the economy, the quasi-
equilibrium is an equilibrium.  
 
Notice that, as in the classical model, the equilibrium allocation of the private provision 
model is optimal for a constrained optimality concept where the utility for each consumer of a 
feasible provision of public goods is appreciated, taking as given the provisions of the other 
consumers. This constrained optimality leads by no way to an optimal level of the feasible 
total supply of public goods. Sub-optimality of the equilibrium provision of public goods is 
the main drawback of the model of private provision of public goods.  
 
Versus Lindahl–Foley equilibrium 
On the contrary, in the Lindahl-Foley equilibrium approach, personalized prices paid by each 
consumers for the total supply of public goods restore optimality of equilibrium allocation. 
 
A Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of E  is a t-uple  
x
i( )
i∈I
, t
i( )
i∈I
,G, y
j
, yg
j( )
j ∈J
, p, pg( )     
in 
  
R+
l( )I × 0,1[ ]I × R+k × Y j
j ∈J
∏ × R l × Rk( ) such that p, pg( )≠ 0,0( ), t
i∈I
∑ i =1, and : 
1. For each i ∈ I , x i,G( ) maximizes ui x i,G( ) in the budget set 
  
Bi p, t
i
pg( )= x i,G( )∈ R+l × R+k p.x i + t i pg .G ≤ p.ei + θij p.y j + pg .ygj( )
j ∈J
∑     
 
  
  
 
2. For each j ∈ I , and for all y j , ygj( )∈ Y j , p.y j + pg .ygj ≤ p.y j + pg .ygj  
3. x
i
,G
i∈I
∑   
 
  = e
i,0( )
i∈I
∑ + y j ,y gj( )
j ∈J
∑ . 
 
As in the private provision equilibrium, Condition 2 means that each producer maximizes his 
profit when facing the equilibrium price vector p, pg( ). As in the private provision 
equilibrium, Condition 3 states that the allocation x
i( )
i∈I
,G
 
  

 , where G is the total supply of 
public goods, is feasible. Condition 1 states that each consumer i  maximizes his utility when 
facing the equilibrium private goods price p  and the equilibrium personalized public goods 
price t
i
pg . 
It simply follows from the equilibrium definition that a Lindahl-Foley equilibrium allocation 
is Pareto optimal, that is, there is no consumption allocation x i( )
i∈I ,G( ) in   R+l( )I × R+k  such 
that x i,G
i∈I
∑   
 
  ∈ e
i,0( )
i∈I
∑ + Y j
j ∈J
∑  and ui x i,G( )> ui x i,G( )∀i ∈ I . First, second welfare 
theorems, equivalence theorem with the limit-core allocation are satisfied in the Lindahl–
Foley approach. 
 
Existence of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium is generally proved by associating to the original 
public goods economy an auxiliary economy with only private goods, defined on a 
commodity space of enlarged dimension. Non-emptiness of the core, and of the Debreu-Scarf 
core,  equilibrium existence require more stringent assumptions than the ones used for 
existence of private provision equilibrium. As in the private provision model, it is assumed 
that there is no initial endowment in public goods. In addition, public goods are never inputs, 
are free-disposable in production, and consumer’s utilities are assumed to be monotone with 
respect to public goods. 
 
Incomplete markets 
The role of a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets is to understand the role of 
assets for the allocation of resources in a world in which time and uncertainty enter in an 
essential way. In the simplest model, there are two time periods ( t = 0 and t =1) and an a 
priori uncertainty at the first period about which of a finite number of states of the world will 
prevail at the second period. Finitely many consumers exchange at each period and in each 
state of the world a same finite number  l  of goods. There is, in addition, at the first period a 
financial market for a finite number of assets bought (or sold) at period 0, which deliver at 
t =1 a random return across the states of the world.  
Let J  be the finite set of assets and S  be the finite set of states of the world. The return of one 
unit of the asset j ∈ J  in each state can be denominated  
• in units of account (nominal assets) 
• in units of one good or of a commodity bundle  e ∈ R l  called “numeraire” (numeraire 
assets) 
• in units of a vector   a j ∈ R l  (real assets). 
Given a price vector   p ∈ R l 1+S( ) for commodities at time 0 and in each state s of period 1, the 
financial return of asset j  is v j p,s( ), differently calculated according to the nominal, 
numeraire or real nature of the asset. The vector map p → v j p,s( )( )
s∈S  describes the financial 
returns of asset j . The S × J  matrix map 
p → V p( )= v j p,s( )( )
s∈S, j ∈J  
summarizes the financial structure of the model. 
 
The financial economy is described by the list 
E = X i,Pi,ω i( )
i∈I ,V( ) 
As in the classical model of general equilibrium, each agent i  of a finite set I  is characterized 
by a consumption set  X i ⊂ R l 1+S( ), a preference correspondence Pi : X h
h ∈I
∏ → X i  and an 
initial endowment in commodities   ω i ∈ R l 1+S( ). We assume in addition that each consumer 
has no initial endowment of assets, and that unlimited short selling of assets is possible.  
Given commodity and asset prices   p,q( )∈ R l 1+S( ) × RJ  measured in units of account, the 
budget set of i  is defined by: 
 
Bi p,q( )= x i ∈ X i
∃zi ∈ RJ
p 0( ).x i 0( )+ q.zi ≤ p 0( ).ω i 0( )
p s( ).x i s( )≤ p s( ).ω i s( )+ v p,s( ).zi,∀s ∈ S
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
It is the multiplicity of the S +1( ) budget constraints of the agents that characterizes models of 
financial markets. If these multiple budget constraints cannot be proved to be equivalent to a 
unique budget constraint defined by the sum over s of the different inequalities, each one 
weighted by a positive coefficient called state price, markets are said to be incomplete. It is 
always the case if there are strictly less assets than states of nature, that is, if J < S . The 
multiplicity of budget constraints expresses that consumers have a (limited) possibility of 
transferring wealth across dates and states, a possibility that is unlimited in case of only one 
budget constraint and null if there is no asset and consumers are obliged to satisfy in each 
state the budget constraint corresponding to this state. 
 
Equilibrium is defined as a pair of admissible actions and prices x i,z i( )
i∈I , p ,q ( )( ) such that  
1. For each i ∈ I , x i ∈ Bi p ,q ( ), z i  is the corresponding portfolio, and 
P i x ( )∩ Bi p ,q ( )= ∅ 
2. x i −ω i( )= 0
i∈I
∑  and z i = 0
i∈I
∑ . 
 
Classically, the first condition expresses that with x i,z i( ), consumer i  optimizes his 
preferences in his budget set. The second condition expresses market clearing under the 
implicit hypothesis  that no production or intertemporal storage is possible and assets are in 
zero net supply. 
 
The equilibrium existence problem has been solved in the eighties. When assets are nominal, 
equilibrium existence can be proved with similar methods to the ones used in the classical 
model. Assumptions are strengthened. In particular, agents satisfy the individual strong 
survival (papers exist weakening this assumption); agent’s preferences satisfy the additional 
convexity assumption  
y i ∈ Pi x( ) and 0 < λ ≤1 imply x i + λ y i − x i( )∈ P i x( ) 
and a kind of local non-satiation at each date-event pair and at every component of a feasible 
consumption. These assumptions on preferences are satisfied when each agent i  has on his 
consumption set   X i = R+l 1+S( ) a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function 
U i x( )= ρsiui x i 0( ),x i s( )( )
s∈S
∑  
where   ui : R+l × R+l → R is a strictly quasi-concave and strictly increasing function, each 
ρsi > 0  denotes the (subjective) probability of state s for agent i , and ρsi
s∈S
∑ =1. 
When assets are numeraire, the same result holds under an assumption of strict desirability of 
the numeraire at each date-event pair and at every component of a feasible consumption. 
Equilibrium exists and under appropriate assumptions can be proved to be generically locally 
unique.  
 
With real assets, the continuity properties of budget correspondences may fail, due to the fact 
that the rank of the return matrix V p( ) is not anymore constant when the commodity price p  
varies. For this reason, equilibrium existence has been proved to be only generic. 
 
In all cases, equilibrium allocations have no reason to be Pareto optimal. In particular, in 
economies without assets but with multiple budget constraints, it is easy to construct 
examples where some equilibrium allocation Pareto dominates another equilibrium allocation.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Obviously, this presentation of the extensions of the classical model is far from being 
exhaustive. A number of other frameworks analyze, in a general equilibrium approach, the 
problems of public policy that have given rise to the study of non-convex economies. The 
same is true for economies with public goods where researches on implementation of 
desirable allocations have considerably developed, in continuation to the equilibrium 
definition problem. And there is an increasing literature on financial markets.  
 
More generally, an exhaustive analysis of all the contexts that general equilibrium can deal 
with would be impossible. With its sophisticated methods, general equilibrium is, for its 
specialists, a great architecture with still incomplete and imperfect pieces of building, but 
always on the way of giving foundations to new themes of economic theory. 
 
Actually, the abstract model of general equilibrium is what is called a “paradigm” whose one 
may and one should ask at what extent it is or not well suited for our understanding of the real 
world. 
 
Glossary 
 
Commodity space: Real vector space whose dimension is equal to the number of 
commodities present in the economy under consideration. 
Continuity properties of a correspondence: A correspondence from a topological space X  
to a topological space Y  has open lower sections if every element of Y  has an open  
inverse image. The correspondence is upper semi-continuous if for every open subset of Y , 
the set of all elements of  X  whose image is contained in this set is open. The 
correspondence is lower semi-continuous if for every open subset of Y , the set of all 
elements of  X  whose image intersects this set is open. 
Correspondence: Sometimes called point-set function, a correspondence associates to each 
element of the definition space a subset (which may be empty) of the arrival space. 
Excess demand correspondence: This correspondence associate to each vector price the 
subset of the commodity space which is equal to the vector difference between the total 
demand and the total supply.   
Free-disposal: Disposal of the excess supply without cost in terms of the use of additional 
inputs. In the real economies, disposal of by-products of a production activity, whatever be 
the form of this disposal (destruction or stocks), is a problematic and costly activity. 
Implicit function theorem: Let U  be an open subset of Rn × Rm  and let f  be a continuously 
differentiable function from Rm × Rq  to Rn . Let a,b( )∈ U  be such that f a,b( )= 0 . If the 
partial derivative ′ f y a,b( ) defines a linear isomorphism from Rq  onto Rn , then there exists in 
Rm × Rq  an open neighborhood V  of a,b( ) contained in U , there exists in Rm  an open 
neighborhood W  of a , there exists a function a  continuously differentiable function  
g :W → Rq  
such that the assertions x,y( )∈ V  and f x,y( )= 0 are equivalent to x ∈ W  and y = g x( ). 
Inverse function theorem: Let U  be an open subset of Rn  and f :U → Rn  be a continuously 
differentiable function whose Jacobian matrix at the point a ∈ U  has  a non-zero determinant. 
Then there exists an open neighborhood V ⊂ U  of a  and an open neighborhood W  of 
b = f a( ) such that f  is a C1-diffeomorphisme of V  onto W , that is, there exists a 
continuously differentiable function g :W → V  which is the inverse function of f . 
Kakutani’s theorem: Let X be a convex compact subset of Rn . An upper semi-continuous  
correspondence ϕ : X → X  with nonempty closed convex values has a fixed point, that is 
there is some x ∈ ϕ x ( ).  
Lebesgue measure: On R, the Lebesgue measure is the unique measure on the Borel sets of 
R (that is on the σ -algebra generated by the family of open sets) whose value on every 
interval is its length. Using product measures, the Lebesgue measure can be generalized to 
Euclidean spaces of any dimension.  
Pareto optimality: A feasible allocation of resources is Pareto efficient (or Pareto optimal) if 
there is no other feasible allocation which will make every consumer better off (or, in case of 
strong Pareto optimality, everyone at least as well off and at least one consumer better off).  
Portfolio: If there is a finite number of assets and if RJ  is the asset space, an asset bundle is 
called portfolio. 
Qualitative game: A game in normal form where the payment function is replaced by a 
preference relation on the outcomes of the game. 
Sard’s theorem: Let U  be an open subset of Rm  and let F  be a r -times continuously 
differentiable function from U  to Rn  with r > max 0,m − n{ }. Then the set of points 
y = F x( ) such that the Jacobian matrix of  F  at x  has a rank smaller than n  has Lebesgue 
measure zero in Rn . 
Utility space: Real vector space whose dimension is equal to the number of consumers. 
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